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IN (PARTIAL) DEFENSE OF STRICT LIABILITY IN CONTRACT
Robert E. Scott*
Forthcoming 107 Mich. L. Rev. (2009)
Many scholars believe that notions of fault
should and do pervade contract doctrine.
Notwithstanding the normative and positive arguments
in favor of a fault-based analysis of particular
contract doctrines, I argue that contract liability is
strict liability at its core.

This core regime is

based on two key prongs: (1) the promisor is liable to
the promisee for breach, and that liability is
unaffected by the promisor’s exercise of due care or
failure to take efficient precautions; and (2) the
promisor’s liability is unaffected by the fact that
the promisee, prior to the breach, has failed to take
cost-effective precautions to reduce the consequences
of non-performance. I offer two complementary
normative justifications for contract law’s stubborn
resistance to consider fault in either of these
instances. First, I argue that there are unappreciated
ways in which courts’ adherence to strict liability
doctrine at the core of contract reduces contracting
costs.

In addition, I argue that a strict liability

core best supports parties’ efforts to access informal

*

Alfred McCormack Professor of Law and Director, Center for

Contract and Economic Organization, Columbia University.
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or relational modes of contracting, especially where
key information is unverifiable.
“Contract liability is strict liability.”
—Restatement (Second) of Contracts 309 (1981)
INTRODUCTION
The Restatement’s oft-quoted assertion about the nature of
contract liability is one of the most imprecise generalizations
ever made about the common law of contract.

Numerous scholars

have pointed out that, in fact, there are many notions of fault
that infuse contract law, ranging from prescriptions against
intentional “bad behavior,” to assessments of the reasonableness
of an actor’s behavior in assessing both liability and damages.
But while there are indeed many “fault lines” in contract,1
speaking at that level of generality has little analytic
purchase.2

In short, from a distance the fault lines in contract

appear broken and indistinct.
1.

George Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 Va. L.

Rev. 1225 (1994)[hereinafter Cohen, Fault Lines]; George M. Cohen, The
Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 941
(1992); George M. Cohen, The Fault that Lies Within Our Contract Law, 107
Mich. L. Rev. ___ (2009) [hereinafter Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law].
2.

See Richard Craswell, When is a Willful Breach ‘Willful’?

A

Puzzle and Two Different Economic Solutions, 107 Mich. L. Rev. ___, ___
(2009)(criticizing Cohen and others for lack of clarity and precision in
analyzing different fault-based notions of contract).
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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In this Article, I propose to defend the notion of strict
liability that lies at the core of the Restatement’s claim.

By

its terms, the Restatement does not rule out fault based
considerations for claims based on promissory estoppel, fraud,
bad faith, mistake, excuse or a host of other issues.

But the

availability of these principles in only in select circumstances
justifies a core no-fault regime.3

This core regime is based on

two key prongs: (1) the promisor is liable to the promisee for
breach, and that liability is unaffected by the promisor’s
exercise of due care or failure to take efficient precautions;
and (2) the promisor’s liability is unaffected by the fact that
the promisee, prior to the breach, has failed to take costeffective precautions to reduce the consequences of nonperformance.4

In terms of the Restatement conception, then,

contract law is strict liability without a contributory
negligence defense.

Notwithstanding the many illustrations of fault lines in
contract, the Restatement’s assertion, as limited above, is
descriptively accurate.

The core of contract law as applied in

the courts is a no-fault regime.

This is so even though

theorists mount powerful arguments on efficiency grounds for a
cost-benefit analysis of promisor and promisee behavior in
particular cases, and even though contract doctrine appears to
invite just such an analysis. For example, if the promisor
3.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Chapter 11, Introductory

Note at 309–12 (1981).
4.

See infra Part I.
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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carelessly fails to take efficient precautions ex ante which
result in breach ex post, the “willful breach doctrine” invites
courts to increase damages to deter such inefficient behavior.
Similarly, if the promisee fails to take efficient precautions
prior to the breach that would reduce or eliminate losses, the
mitigation principle invites courts to apply a “contributory
negligence” bar to recovery. However, a large sample of cases
shows that courts decline to employ the willful breach doctrine
to deter an inefficient breach. And despite evidence that the
promise has failed to take precautions prior to breach that
would have reduced losses, courts adhere strictly to the rule
that the promisee’s mitigation responsibility is not triggered
until the promisor breaches.

The courts’ reluctance to adopt a comparative fault
standard in assessing the core question of liability for breach
is all the more surprising given that comparative fault
principles are found elsewhere in contract law, most notably in
the doctrines of unjust enrichment and unilateral mistake.5
Viewed in this light, the question is not why contract law fails
to acknowledge explicitly the many different fault principles
that it embraces implicitly.

Rather, the puzzle is why courts

adhere to a no-fault regime at the core of contract liability

5.

The doctrine of unjust enrichment and the doctrine of

unilateral mistake both have compound liability rules that hinge on the
“reason to know” standard.

For unjust enrichment, see Day v. Caton, 119

Mass. 513 (1876) (Holmes, J.); for unilateral mistake, see Restatement
(Second) of Contract § 153(b).
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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even though contract doctrine invites them to consider fault in
other instances.

In Part I of this Article, I set out the case that courts
are committed to a strict liability regime at what I call the
“core” of contract law.

This Part focuses on the evidence of

strict liability as demonstrated by (a) courts’ reluctance to
use the willful breach doctrine to deter inefficient breach by
promisors, and (b) courts’ reluctance to use the mitigation
principle to deter inefficient over reliance by promisees.

In

Part II, I offer two complementary normative justifications for
contract law’s stubborn resistance to fault principles at its
core.

I argue that there are unappreciated ways in which

courts’ adherence to strict liability doctrine reduces
contracting costs.

In addition, I argue that a strict liability

core best supports parties’ efforts to access informal or
relational modes of contracting, especially where key
information is unverifiable.

Part III briefly concludes.

I. THE STRICT LIABILITY CORE OF CONTRACT LAW
A. The Promisor’s Behavior: The Willful Breach Doctrine
Among the many debates about fault in contract law, one
principle remains unchallenged: A promisor is strictly liable
for defective performance or non performance despite her
exercise of due care.

Even the most fervent adherents of fault

in contract law concede that the law always applies this rule
strictly.6
6.

Thus, the promisee does not have to prove that the
Cohen, Fault Lines, supra note 1, at 1238.
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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promisor failed to take cost effective precautions against
breach.7

Nor, for that matter, can the promisor escape liability

by showing that the breach was caused by exogenous factors
beyond her control.8

But there is a doctrine in contract law that invites courts
to adjust liability or damages if the promisor’s breach was
“willful.” Courts have attached this doctrine primarily to the
choice of damage measures in cases involving breach of a
contract for services.

In such cases, promisees commonly sue

for the “cost of completion”—of purchasing a substitute
performance in the market.

However, the cost of completion

sometimes exceeds the gain that the seller’s performance would
have produced.

This problem usually occurs in construction

contexts. In Jacob & Youngs v. Kent,9 for example, the contractor
deviated from the agreed upon performance in an apparently minor
way, but the costs of remedying that defect were much greater
than the reduction in property value that the deviation had
caused.

Similarly, in Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Co.,10 a lessee

agreed to restore the lessor’s property after the lessee had
used it, but the costs of restoration turned out to be much

7.

Id.

8.

This statement must be qualified to the extent that the

promisor can establish an excuse owing to the fact that the risk in
question was not allocated in the contract.
9.

230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921).

10.

382 P2d 109 (Okla. 1962). .
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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higher than the resultant increase in property value.11

In cases

like these, where repair involves unreasonable destruction of
the contractor’s work or the cost of completion is grossly
disproportionate to the benefit obtained, the owner can recover
only the diminished value on the ground that the standard remedy
would produce “economic waste.”12

There is substantial uncertainty, however, as to the
appropriate circumstances for applying the “economic waste”
doctrine.

A key doctrinal prerequisite is the finding that the

contractor has substantially performed the contract in good
faith and that the breach was not “willful.”13

In both of the

celebrated cases noted above, the court declined to find fault
with the promisor’s breach.

In Jacob & Youngs, Justice Cardozo

invoked the economic waste doctrine to limit the owners’ damage
award to the diminution in value caused by the breach.

He found

(at least implicitly) that the contractor’s breach was
accidental and not willful.

In Peevyhouse, the majority did not

address the willful breach doctrine directly, but Justice Irwin
dissented on the ground that the breach “was willful and not in
good faith.” Thus, the majority at least implicitly rejected
application of the willful breach doctrine to the facts in the
record.

11.

In Peevyhouse, the diminished market value was $300 while the

cost of completion was estimated to be $29,000.

12.

Kurt v. Reams, 683 N.W.2d 127 (2004).

13.

As Cardozo famously stated in Jacob & Youngs, “the willful

transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgression.” 129 N.E. at 891.
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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To be sure, the precise behavior intended to be captured by
the willful breach doctrine is unclear.14

However, the concept

should be sufficiently capacious to embrace “inefficient
behavior” by the promisor.

By this standard, a breach is

willful when the promisor fails to take cost-effective
precautions in performing a contract that is ex ante efficient
and then breaches the contract to avoid incurring substantial
losses. In using this standard to evaluate the actions of
promisors in cases such as Jacob & Youngs and Peevyhouse, it is
important to recognize that the promisees in such cases will
have prepaid for the service in a master contract.

The fact of

prepayment is often ignored by courts and commentators because,
in such a contract, the services are bundled together and are
not separately priced.

For example, the royalty on the mineral

lease in a case such as Peevyhouse is smaller if the mining
company agrees to restore the land at the end of the lease term,
but rarely if ever is there an explicit “sub-price” for the
agreement to restore.

Likewise, the cost of constructing a

building is seldom disaggregated into separate prices for the
promise to install the plumbing and the promise to correct

14.

See Richard Craswell, When is Breach Willful?

A Puzzle and

Two Different Economic Solutions, supra note 2, at __ (citing Arthur
Linton Corbin, 5 Corbin on Contracts 545 (1951): “The word...‘wilful’
[sic]is seldom accompanied by any discussion of its meaning or
classification of the cases that should fall within it”); Steve Thel &
Peter Siegelman, Wilfulness vs Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense of
Wilful Breach Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. __, __ (2009) (arguing that the
willful breach doctrine is “largely epiphenomenal”).
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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defective work. Yet, no one would claim that the mining lessee
agreed to restore for nothing or that the building contractor
did not charge for nonconforming plumbing.15

The fact of prepayment reduces the incentives for the
promisor to take precautions ex ante that would reduce the ex
post cost of completion.

Promisors such as the contractor in

Jacob & Youngs and the mining company in Peevyhouse can
sometimes reduce the cost of performance below the promisee’s
value by taking precautions between the time of contract and the
time of completion.

But a prepaid promisor’s incentive to

invest efficiently in cost reduction is materially reduced if
her damage exposure for failing to invest is capped by the
diminished value measure.

A finding of fault based on “inefficient behavior” in these
situations is appropriate if four key conditions are satisfied.
First, the promisor is able to take a precaution during the
course of performance that reduces the expected cost of the
contractually required service below its expected value to the
promisee.

15.

Second, the promisee is an imperfect monitor and is

Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Market Damages, Efficient

Contracting and the Economic Waste Fallacy, 108 Colum. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2008). The standard construction contract contains a separate
promise by the contractor to correct any defective construction.

This

promise remains binding even after substantial performance of the
contract.

See e.g., the standard form AIA Contract, General Conditions of

the Contract for Construction, Document A-201 § 12.2.1(1997).
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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unlikely to detect the promisor’s lack of precaution.

Third,

the promisee may never (or only later) discover the promisor’s
failure to take precautions.

And fourth, the promisor is able

to perform the contractually required service ex post, albeit at
a much more expensive price.

Where these conditions are

satisfied, the economic waste rule should not be applied:
restricting promisees’ awards to diminished market value creates
an incentive for sellers not to take the efficient precaution.
Rather, courts should invoke the “willful breach” doctrine: an
award of cost of completion damages creates a positive incentive
for sellers to take the efficient precaution.16 Cost of
completion damages in such a case are an efficient deterrent
against this moral hazard.
The question, then, is whether the contractor’s
behavior in Jacob & Youngs sufficiently satisfied the
“inefficient behavior” test to justify invoking the willful
breach doctrine and considering fault in the assessment of
damages. Virtually all the ensuing commentary has accepted
Cardozo’s characterization of the contractor’s behavior in
Jacob & Youngs as accidental and has justified the non-

16.

This argument is formally set out in Schwartz & Scott, Market

Damages, supra note 1, at 42–48.

U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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willful characterization of the breach.17

Unfortunately,

however, that characterization appears to be false.

The

extraordinary costs of completion in Jacob & Youngs
resulted from the contractor’s failure to inspect the pipe
to ensure that it complied with the contract
specifications.

In dissent, Justice McLaughlin recited the

key facts from the record and concluded that the failure to
inspect was “due to gross neglect....”18
The record in Jacob & Youngs thus shows that each of the
four conditions supporting a finding of inefficient behavior was
satisfied.19 There was (1) an apparently efficient precaution—
17.

See Craswell, Willful Breach, supra note 1, at _____ (“The

builder in Kent used the wrong brand of pipe, apparently by accident.”);
Patricia Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 24 Ariz. L. Rev. 733 (1982) (same); but see Thel &
Siegelman, Wilfulness v. Expectation at 13 (characterizing the
contractor’s behavior as negligent but justifying the result on other
grounds).
18.

129 N.E. at 891-2 (“ no examination ... was made by the

plaintiff, the subcontractor, defendant’s architect, or anyone else, of
any of the pipe except the first delivery, until after the building had
been completed).
19.

Note that we must assume, per Cardozo, that the failure to

install the contract-specified pipe was, in fact, a breach. This
assumption is supported in the case by the architect’s refusal to give his
certificate.
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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checking the pipe as it was delivered to insure that it met
contract specifications; (2) evidence that the owner, through
his architect, was an imperfect monitor (he was able to check
the first installment of pipe, but not the remainder); (3)
difficulty in discovering the unsatisfactory performance because
most of the pipe was embedded in the walls of the house; and (4)
performance that was inefficient ex post—the high cost of
removal caused the ex post market price of performance to so
exceed the diminished market value that it likely also exceeded
the buyer’s value from performance.20

An analysis of the facts in Peevyhouse supports the same
conclusion: The breach was a result of the mining company’s
failure to take ex ante precautions and a fault-based analysis
should have invoked the willful breach doctrine.

As Judith

Maute has shown, the mining company in Peevyhouse could have
stripped the land with restoration costs in mind.21

Also, the

plaintiff, Garland, admitted at trial that (1) the owners had
insisted that the regrading provisions be included in the
contract, (2) they would not agree to the coal mining lease
unless the promise to re-grade was included, (3) heavy rains
caused the plaintiff to postpone the promised remedial work, and
(4) in the interim, plaintiff relocated the grading equipment to
another profitable site and decided not to return to complete
the remedial work.22
20.

Schwartz & Scott, Market Damages, supra note 1, at 44.

21.

Judith Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Revisited: The Ballad

of Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1341 (1995).
22.

Id. at 1413.
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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In short, declining to apply the willful breach doctrine
and restricting the promisee to the diminished value measure in
the contexts these cases exemplify is inefficient.

This

inference is supported by a more systematic examination of the
case law.

In order to evaluate how contemporary American courts

treat economic waste claims, I recently analyzed a sample of 110
cases, most of which were litigated in the past two decades.23
In twenty-nine cases, the courts were faced with the question of
the appropriate measure of damages when the evidence showed that
the cost to complete would greatly exceed the value of
performance to the plaintiff.

Nineteen cases had facts that

were sufficiently clear to permit an inference that the seller
could have taken cost-effective precautions to reduce the cost
of performance.24

In these cases, where the sellers’ actions

likely would have reduced costs, the buyers’ capacity to monitor
was also likely imperfect: they were mostly amateurs, and they
could not constantly be on site.

As discussed above, in cases

such as these it is efficient for courts to award cost of
completion damages, even where the ex post cost of performance
significantly exceeds the buyer’s ex post valuation.

Such an

award is efficient as it induces the seller to take the
precaution that would forestall the excess costs.

Yet, in only

23.

Scott & Schwartz, Market Damages, supra note 1, at 13–24.

24.

See cases cited Id at n. 123.
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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one of the thirty cases did a court apply the willful breach
doctrine and award the larger damages measure.25

The evidence from Jacob & Youngs, Peevyhouse and their
progeny points in a single direction.

Courts continue to follow

the strict liability principle that the promisor’s behavior is
irrelevant to the issues of liability and damages.

In

particular, courts decline the open invitation of the willful
breach doctrine to apply fault-based principles in cases where
strong arguments suggest that the breach was inefficient and
should have been deterred.

Before trying to justify this

surprising conclusion, I next examine the second prong of the
core strict liability idea: that the promisee’s behavior prior
to the breach is irrelevant to questions of liability or
damages.
B. The Promisee’s Behavior: The Mitigation Principle
Common law courts have consistently held that a promisee
need not take steps to avoid losses so long as the promisor has
not clearly and definitively repudiated the contract.26

This

rule limits the ability of courts to encourage both parties to

25.

Roudis v. Hubbard, 574 N.Y.S. 2d 95 (1991) (applying cost of

completion where contractor intentionally omitted styrofoam insulation and
footing drains required by the plans).
26.

See, e.g., Southern Nat’l Bank v. TRI Fin. Corp., 317 F. Supp.

1173, 1185 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (“Defendant had neither breached nor indicated
an intention to do so; having not yet been injured by any breach of
defendant’s, plaintiff had no damages to mitigate.”).
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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take cost-effective precautions that will reduce the expected
losses from a contract breach.27 Moreover, it is well established
that, absent a legal restraint on the promisee’s reliance
actions, the promisee will over-rely under an expectation
damages default rule.28 These inefficiencies can be moderated,
however, by careful application of the rules governing
anticipatory repudiation.

If promisors repudiate as soon as

they are aware of events that will ultimately lead to nonperformance, they can, at least in theory, induce the promisee
to mitigate sooner rather than later.

27.

The classic article is Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract,

and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1985); see also
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va. L. Rev. 967, 989–95
(1983), and Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal
Precaution Problem, 17 J. Legal. Stud. 401 (1988).
28.

Under an award of full expectancy, the promisee will recover

her full valuation and thus she is motivated to invest in the subject
matter of the contract until her marginal gain equals her marginal cost.
But the promisee does not consider that performance would be inefficient
in some ex post states of the world.
investment is a social waste.

In these states, the promisee’s

See e.g., William P. Rogerson, Efficient

Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 Rand J. Econ. 39,
47 (1984) (concluding that under expectation damages buyers will choose a
greater than efficient level of reliance).
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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A comparative fault analysis, therefore, should focus on
the rules governing anticipatory repudiation: the more likely
that the promisee’s behavior is contributing to the losses from
breach, the more likely a court should be (1) to find that the
actions of the promisor constitute a repudiation of the
contract, and (2) to invoke at that time the doctrine of
avoidable consequences and the promisee’s mitigation
responsibility. By interpreting anticipatory rules in this way,
courts could motivate parties to avoid or reduce the breach
costs that would otherwise result if the promisee were allowed
to delay mitigation until the time of performance.

To see this, consider an example in which Adam agrees on
July 1 to deliver an air conditioning unit to Christy on
December 1 at a cost of $500,000.29

Assume that an explosion in

Adam’s plant on September 1 causes a two month delay in delivery
that will cost Christy $100,000.

Suppose, however, that if Adam

informs Christy on September 1 of his inability to meet the
contract deadline, Christy can redesign the building under
construction to accommodate an air conditioning unit that is
equivalent in quality but differently designed. Christy’s total
losses due to Adam’s breach would then be only $40,000—i.e. the
$20,000 additional price of the substitute air conditioner plus
the $20,000 additional cost to redesign the building. Adam would
obviously prefer limiting his maximum loss to $40,000 by having
Christy redesign her building. By repudiating on September 1, at
29.

The discussion that follows draws on Robert E. Scott & Jody S.

Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 815–18 (4th ed. 2007).
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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the time of the plant explosion, Adam would hope to induce
Christy immediately to mitigate her damages by making the
necessary adjustments.

The doctrine of anticipatory repudiation thus can be used
to extend the duty of mitigation to a period before the time for
performance has expired.

Because it potentially enables the

parties to avoid wasteful actions taken in reliance on
performance, applying the doctrine in this way brings actual
contracts closer to the ideally efficient contract; one which
would require parties to make all cost-effective adjustments to
events occurring after the contract was formed.

But courts have been reluctant to require mitigation at the
time of repudiation. The common law rule remains wellestablished:

the promisee can either seek damages at the time

of repudiation or wait until the time for performance and
recover market damages at that later date.30

As a result,

promisees operating under the common law rule are free to
exacerbate their damages by waiting until the time for
performance to mitigate.

And when promisees exercise this

option, they undermine the possibility of mutually beneficial
post-contract adjustments. The common law rule thus seems
inconsistent with the fault-based, cost-benefit analysis
embodied in the doctrine of avoidable consequences.

Returning

to our example above, giving Christy the option of waiting
30.

See, e.g., Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195 F. 2d 977

(8th cir. 1952); Missouri Furnace Co. v. Cochran, 8 F. 463 (W.D. Pa.
1881).
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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beyond the time of repudiation is inefficient because she will
not internalize the cost of delay to Adam.

Moreover, she will

be motivated to wait as long as she can since she retains any
benefits from a declining market while Adam must bear all the
costs.31
C. Summary
As the above discussion has shown, in cases where courts
are asked to directly consider the relevance of promisor and
promisee behavior in assessing the core questions of liability
and damages, the strict liability regime announced in the
Restatement is alive and well.

To be sure, the fact that these

core questions remain grounded in a system of strict liability
does not undermine familiar claims that elsewhere contract
embraces fault-based notions.

But it does deepen the puzzle as

to why those fault lines have failed to penetrate the two core
questions:

will the promisor’s liability be increased if it

appears that breach was caused by her inefficient behavior, and
will the promisee’s recovery be diminished by evidence that his
inefficient behavior contributed significantly to the quantum of
loss?

In both cases, the answer at common law and in

contemporary litigation is a clear “no.”

In the next Part, I

ask whether this rejection of a fault-based system at the core
of contract can be justified.

31.

The Uniform Commercial Code permits the promisee to wait a

“commercially reasonable time” following the repudiation, and thus also
fails a comparative fault analysis. UCC § 2-610(a).
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
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II. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR STRICT LIABILITY
The normative case for strict liability rests on two
complementary arguments. Both are based on the claim that
commercially sophisticated parties prefer strict liability rules
over fault-based rules, especially at the core of contract.32
These arguments center on the revealed preference of commercial
parties for precise or bright-line rules over broad standards
and on a revealed preference for party autonomy in selecting
precisely when and where standards are preferable to rules.33

In

the first case, the preference for autonomy in selecting between
rules and standards permits parties to optimize contracting
costs by shifting them between the front end and the back end of
the contractual process. In the second case, the preservation of
formal rules offers parties the choice of improving contractual
incentives by relying on informal or relational contracting as a
complement to the formal contract. In this Part, I first
consider the theoretical arguments that support the claim that
commercial parties prefer formal rules in general and strict

32.

In principle, the arguments outlined here might also be

applied to contracts made by commercially unsophisticated parties.

But

defending an extension of the argument to such cases would require
additional analysis to take into account a range of considerations which I
do not undertake here.
33.

My argument that the law properly attends to the revealed

preferences of commercial parties can be supported on both efficiency and
autonomy grounds.

And, to be sure, moral theorists may offer other

normative arguments in favor of strict liability.
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liability at the core of contract in particular.

Thereafter, I

evaluate the evidence that supports the theoretical claims.
A. Contract Design and the Choice between Rules and Standards34
Why might commercial parties prefer strict liability to a
fault-based regime?

One answer lies in the trade off between

contracting costs and the goal of improving contractual
incentives. Commercial parties will weigh front- or back-end
contracting costs against the incentive gains that they produce—
what George Triantis and I have referred to elsewhere as the
incentive “bang” for their contracting-cost “buck.”35

And they

will prefer improved incentives of the sort we examined earlier
only if those incentives do not generate even greater
contracting costs. To understand parties’ apparent preference
for formal rules like strict liability, one must consider the
contract design challenges that they face in writing incomplete
contracts.36
34.

This discussion draws on Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis,

Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 Yale L. J. 814 (2006); and
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory
of Contract Design, 56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187 (2005).
35.

Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 34, at

36.

Under conditions of uncertainty, contracts will be incomplete

817.

in the sense that information costs will make it impossible to distinguish
ex ante the ex post states of the world that call for different
obligations. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of
Incomplete Contracts, 66 Rev. Econ. Stud. 115 (1999); Oliver Hart & John
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Incomplete contracts are challenging because the parties
must attempt to balance two seemingly inconsistent goals.

One

goal is to encourage “relation-specific investments” that
enhance the expected surplus from the transaction. But the
commitment that is necessary to motivate surplus-maximizing
specific investments will typically conflict with the goal of
preserving flexibility—which is necessary to halt those
transactions which prove to have insufficient net value when
uncertainty is resolved.

One way to encourage initial investments is for the parties
to write a contract with precise, unchanging terms or “rules”,
i.e., determinate outcomes that apply across the board
regardless of the eventual state of the world.

But because the

rules are inflexible, they may not respond to what actually
happens and may be inefficient ex post.37 Alternatively, if the
Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 Econometrica 755 (1988);
Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J. L.
Econ. & Org. 119 (1988).
37.

One solution is for the parties to renegotiate the contract

once uncertainties are resolved.

But renegotiation raises the risk of a

hold up; and this, in turn, undermines the incentives for parties to make
specific investments in the first place. For discussion, see Oliver Hart &
John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ.
98 (1990); Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational
Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, J. L.
Econ & Org. 199 (1988).
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future is very uncertain, the parties may instead emphasize the
value of flexibility by drafting a contract with vague
standards, i.e., “soft” terms such as those that require
subsequent adjustment in good faith to new facts as they arise.
But a promisor with the discretion to adjust performance is
likely to choose the best alternative for him even though the
self-interested choice is unlikely to be the best way to
maximize the parties’ joint welfare.38

In short, neither precise rules nor vague standards can,
standing alone, solve the problem of incomplete contracts.
Therefore, parties predictably seek to optimize total
contracting costs by trading off the respective benefits and
costs of commitment and flexibility. They can do this by
shifting their costs between the front and back end of the
contracting process. For example, when the parties agree to
bright-line rules, such as the buyer’s obligation to purchase a
precisely specified, customized machine at a fixed price, they
encourage the seller to undertake the required investment by
limiting the court’s authority to determine their particular
performance obligations. But this strategy requires the parties
to rely on mere estimates of the likelihood of future events.
Alternatively, when the parties agree to a vague standard, i.e.,
to adjust the price of the machine in good faith as conditions
subsequently require, they effectively delegate the
specification of performance requirements to a court at the back
end of the contracting process. This provides flexibility and

38.

Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the

Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L. J. 541, 602–3 (2003).
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allows them potentially to benefit from the court’s hindsight
advantage but at a cost of undermining the buyer’s commitment to
pay and the seller’s willingness to invest. The parties thus
choose between these front- and back-end specification
mechanisms by comparing the benefits of ex ante commitment
against the flexibility offered by the court’s hindsight
advantage.39

This model of contract design suggests that courts should
refrain from filling contractual gaps with broad standards in
cases where the parties are silent.

A court may be tempted

(with the encouragement of one of the parties) to see gaps and
to use fault-based doctrines such as mistake, excuse or
frustration as devices for implying standards into the parties’
agreement.

But this is generally an error.

Commercial parties

can include standards in their contract at relatively low cost.
They also have superior knowledge regarding the context of their
contractual relationship, which provides the basis for
determining the optimal mix of precise and vague terms.40

As a

rule of thumb, therefore, courts are wise to assume that the

39.

The options available to the parties are even broader than the

stark choice between rules and standards.

With the aid of interpretation

maxims, parties can design combinations of precise and vague terms that
define more exactly the “space” within which a court has discretion in
interpreting the contract. For discussion, see Scott & Triantis,
Anticipating Litigation, supra note 34, at 848–56.
40.

See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 38,

at 545.
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absence of vague standards in commercial contracts is an
instruction from the parties to focus interpretation on the
precise terms of the contract.

This preference for party autonomy in selecting what
standards to use and when to use them supports the claim that
commercial parties will prefer strict liability rules to broad,
fault-based standards.

In addition to the trade off between

front- and back-end contracting costs, bright line rules offer
commercial parties the opportunity to resolve their disputes
without a full-blown trial.

It is plausible to believe that the

more complex the factual issues in litigation, the easier it
will be for one party to create disputes regarding the
appropriateness of the other’s behavior.

Thus, litigation is

likely to be more costly in a fault-based regime because the
parties more frequently will have full trials. When parties
weigh their contract design choices, they will not only consider
the costs and gains from creating the deal initially; they will
also consider the likelihood and costs of later disputes.

The

fact that fault regimes increase the likelihood and cost of
disputes explains why parties may prefer contracts that only
crudely encourage efficient behavior but significantly reduce
the contracting costs of enforcement.

B.

Rules v. Standards and the Choice between Formal and
Informal Enforcement.41

41.

This discussion draws on Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-

Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1641 (2003).
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As suggested in the earlier discussion, contract design is
not merely a matter of calculating the costs and benefits of
negotiating particular terms in a contract.

In addition to the

front end cost of negotiating a contract, parties must attend to
the back end problems of verifying and enforcing their
respective obligations in court.

A focus on the costs of

verifying contractual obligations motivates parties to consider
the choice between formal and informal means of enforcement.

In many instances, an agreement between two commercial
parties will be self-enforcing because both parties want to earn
and preserve a good reputation so as to enhance their selfesteem and future business prospects.42

Moreover, agreements

will also be self-enforcing to the extent that the parties
anticipate that the expected profits from future dealings are
greater than the gains from breaching the existing contract.43
Even where loss of reputation and the threat of retaliation
are insufficient to induce performance, powerful norms of
reciprocity appear to enhance and extend the reach of informal
42.

For discussion, see Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra

note 38, at 557–8 (2003)(Reputations work well in small trading
communities, where information about others actions are common knowledge
and boycotts of bad actors are readily enforced).
43.

Retaliation has its limits:

The threat that the other party

will no longer deal with the promisor may be insufficient to induce
performance if parties come to realize that the relationship is soon to
terminate.

See e.g., Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-

Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 Econ. Inquiry 444 (1996).
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enforcement.

A substantial body of experimental evidence shows

that a preference for reciprocity—i.e., the willingness to
reward cooperation and to punish selfishness—can motivate
cooperation even in arms-length interactions between complete
strangers.44

This evidence suggests that contracting parties

frequently can (and do) turn to informal means of enforcement
based on trust and reciprocity in addition to the desire to
maintain a good reputation or the prospect of profitable future
dealings.

And if parties are able to rely on these informal

methods of enforcement, they may be able to create contractual
commitments that are at once sufficiently credible to motivate

44.

This substantial body of experimental evidence shows that

individuals respond cooperatively to generous acts, and, conversely,
punish non-cooperative behavior. Moreover, individuals will repay
generosity and punish selfishness even if doing so is costly and yields
neither present nor future material rewards.

See, e.g., Matthew Rabin,

Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 Am. Econ. Rev.
1281 (1993); David K. Levine, Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in
Experiments, 1 Rev. Econ. Dynam. 593 (1998); Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, A
Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, 114 Q. J. Econ. 817
(1999); Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, & Georg Kirchsteiger, Reciprocity as a
Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence, 65 Econometrica 833
(1997). For a review of the literature, see Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt,
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity—Evidence and Economic Applications,
University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics,
Working Paper No. 75, at 2–3 (2001).
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efficient investments ex ante and sufficiently flexible to
ensure efficient adjustment ex post.

So, what role does (and should) legal enforcement play in a
world where informal enforcement is pervasive and robust?
First, note that informal enforcement generally is cheaper than
formal enforcement because a party only needs to expend costs to
observe the other’s behavior, while formal enforcement requires
additional resources in verifying that behavior to a court.
Moreover, informal enforcement is often better than formal
enforcement: Parties can make credible promises regarding
observable but non-verifiable measures of performance, thus
achieving contractual objectives that may not be possible with
formal enforcement.45 To be sure, there is still an important
role for formal contract enforcement. Common sense tells us that
relationships relying on informal enforcement can break down,
and when they do, the parties will resort to costly litigation.
When reciprocity breaks down in complex transactions, the courts
can serve a valuable function by making factual determinations
to unravel complex behaviors.

46

45.

Scott, Self-Enforcing Agreements, supra note 41, at 1667–72.

46.

In complex interactions, a failure to cooperate may not be

observable immediately, or else a cooperative response may be mistakenly
interpreted as a defection from cooperative norms. Robert E. Scott,
Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005,
2050–52 (1987). A disinterested adjudicator may be in better position to
sort out complex behavior, detect a breach, and, by imposing a predetermined sanction, forestall attempts by the aggrieved party to respond
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Thus, a central question remains:
of enforcement interact with each other?

How do the various means
The available evidence

suggests that legal enforcement is often imperialistic; that an
effort to superimpose legal enforcement on a regime of selfenforcement can displace or “crowd out” informal mechanisms.47
The experimental evidence of crowding out undermines the
argument that courts should adopt a broad, fault-based approach
to enforcing contracts. The understandable instinct to deter
inefficient behavior may well prove counter-productive in the
long run.

As the evidence suggests, extending legal enforcement

to the difficult-to-verify questions of willful breach and over
reliance may well impair the efficacy of informal means of
enforcement that rely instead on reciprocity norms.

disproportionately. Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, The Limits of
Leviathan: Contract Theory and The Enforcement of International Law 99–100
(2006).

47.
hypothesis.

A number of studies have confirmed the crowding-out
For discussion see Scott, Self-Enforcing Agreements, supra

note --, at 1688–92. Other recent experiments also show that if there is
some probability of continued transactions, then legal enforcement that is
limited to the verifiable dimensions of the agreement will enhance
cooperation in the dimensions of the agreement that are non-verifiable.
Sergio Lazzarini, Gary J. Miller & Todd R. Zenger, Order with Some Law:
Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements, 20
J. L. Econ. & Org. 261 (2004).
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As we have seen, common law contract doctrine has resisted
the invitation to imply broad fault standards of behavior at the
core of contract.

Thus, if a promise falls within the core of

legal enforcement, contract law fills only a few gaps, using
simple, verifiable strict liability rules when it does so.48

The

evidence that there are informal means of enforcing commitments
that courts cannot readily verify supports this approach. The
more general lesson for courts, therefore, is that an effort to
judicialize notions of comparative fault and reciprocal behavior
may well destroy the very informality that makes these
mechanisms so effective in the absence of judicial enforcement.49
C. The Evidence
While there are good theoretical reasons to believe that
commercial parties prefer a strict liability regime to one based
on fault, critics may argue that theoretical inferences about
parties’ intentions are fraught with peril.50

If commercial

parties prefer a formal, strict liability regime, it may be
argued, then why don’t they say so?

The short answer is that they do. A common provision found
in many alliance agreements is the following:

48.

For discussion, see Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract

Law, 54 U. Toronto L. J. 369 (2004); Robert E. Scott, The Case for
Formalism in Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847 (2000).
49

Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 597, 615
(1990).
50.
See Cohen, Fault Within Contract Law, supra note 1.
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The Parties’ legal obligations under this Alliance
Agreement are to be determined from the precise and
literal language of this Alliance Agreement and not
from the imposition of state laws attempting to impose
additional duties of good faith, fair dealing or
fiduciary obligations that were not the express basis
of the bargain at the time this Agreement was made.
The Parties are sophisticated business entities with
legal counsel that have been retained to review the
terms of this Alliance Agreement and the Parties
represent that they have fully read this Alliance
Agreement, and understand and accept its terms.51
In addition to such anecdotal evidence from individual
contracts, the available data support the strict liability
theory.

First, Lisa Bernstein’s pioneering work shows that

parties who are members of trade associations—and thus who rely
on both informal or relational enforcement as well as third
party enforcement—carefully preserve formal, strict liability
rules and reject broad standards in assessing performance,

51.

Alliance Agreement - E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. and

EarthShell Corp., available at: onecle.com, http://www.onecle.com, and
the Contracting and Organizations Research Institute,
http://cori.missour.edu.

U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
Page 31

MLR 107-8
SSRN version

Edit Format DocumentDefense of Strict Liability in Contract -

breach and liability.52

Bernstein argues that this regime can

best be understood as a mechanism for preserving the space for
both formal and informal norms to operate.

Second, recent work by Eisenberg and Miller studying choice
of law and choice of forum clauses in a data set of 2865
contracts provides empirical support for the claim that
commercial parties prefer the binary strict liability regime of
the traditional common law.53

Specifically, their study showed

that parties choose New York law in 46% of the contracts and New
York as the forum state in 41% of the contracts.54

California,

on the other hand was chosen for its contract law in less than
8% of the contracts even though its commercial activity, as
measured by the place of business of the contracting parties,
was second only to New York.55

52.

Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:

Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 Mich. L.
Rev. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1765 (1996).
53.

Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York:

An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in PubliclyHeld Companies’ Contracts (mimeo 2007).

54.

Id. at 18–19.

Delaware was a distant second to New York, with

about 15% of the parties choosing its law.
even 10 % of the choices of law.
55.

No other state accounted for

Id.

Id. at 23.
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The significance of this striking differential in party
preference is illuminated in a recent paper by Geoff Miller that
analyzes the differences in contract law between New York and
California.56

Miller’s analysis confirms the conventional

wisdom: New York strictly enforces bargains and displays little
tolerance of efforts to balance interests ex post.

California,

by contrast, is far more willing to adopt fault-based
considerations and to revise contracts on the grounds of
fairness, equity, or public policy.

As Miller concludes, “the

revealed preferences of sophisticated parties support arguments
by Schwartz, Scott and others that formalistic rules offer
superior value for the interpretation and enforcement of
commercial contracts.”

57

The theory and evidence that supports the normative case
for strict liability in contract is partial in two respects.
First, it is partial because the theory and evidence largely
applies to commercially sophisticated parties.

Thus, the

normative claims for strict liability have less force, if any,
when applied to other areas of contract law, and particularly
those that concern contracts made by relatively unsophisticated
parties.

The case is partial in a second respect as well:

strict liability in contract exists largely in a narrow domain—
the primary behavior of the promisor and promisee, respectively,
in the performance of the contract and in reliance on that
performance.
56.

Nevertheless, the theory and evidence supporting

Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains on the Red-eye: New Light on

Contract Theory (mimeo 2008).
57.

Id. at 1 et seq.
U of M Law School Publications Center, November 19, 2008, 3:04 PM
Page 33

MLR 107-8
SSRN version

Edit Format DocumentDefense of Strict Liability in Contract -

strict liability rules within those two domains is largely
unchallenged.
III. CONCLUSION
The claim that strict liability in contract is a myth58
faces two formidable obstacles.
descriptively inaccurate.

First, the claim is

At the core of contractual

obligations, strict liability is alive and well.

If one focuses

on what courts actually do, there is substantial evidence that
they decline opportunities to use the willful breach doctrine to
deter inefficient promisor breaches, and, in addition, they
decline opportunities to deploy the mitigation principle to
deter inefficient over-reliance by promisees.
is normatively problematic.

Second, the claim

Notions of autonomy and efficiency

both support the claim that, in assessing performance and the
response to nonperformance, commercial parties will prefer
strict liability rules to fault-based rules.

While the evidence

is incomplete, it is nevertheless significant that the available
theory and evidence point in one direction — significant enough
to shift the intellectual burden of proof.

58.

See Cohen, The Fault Lines, supra note 1, at 1312 (“But we

have already seen that strict liability is a myth.”)
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